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'^[0] /{o{  }% 0hgUSCQeQoeQ ̙ ??v% ? 0 ]vc   @lʑ^ lʑ  XTableStyleMedium2PivotStyleLight16`]Sheet1·Sheet2^Sheet3VV`i C: Year of Build Type of ShipDetention PlaceDetention CountryDate of DetentionDetainable deficiencies Flag of Ship 7 Bulk Carrier 7 2022.1.10 7 INDONESIA 71. 01305 WORK ACCIDENT THAT RESULTED IN 2 FATALITIES ON SHIP WERE NOT RECORED 2. MASTER AND C/O WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH EMERGENCY RESPONSE ON BOARD. 3. EMERGENCY PROCEDURE DOES NOT WORK ON THE SHIP, WHEN ACCIDENT OCCURED THE CAPTAIN DOES NOT INFORM /FAIL TO INFORM THE PORT AUTHORITY. 4. EMERGENCY RESPONSE AT THE COMPANY AND THE SHIP DID NOT WORK, WHEN THE INCIDENT THE PARTY APPOINTED BY THE COMPANY COULD NOT BE CONTACTED BY THE CAPTAIN.THE PROCESS OF EVACUATING THE BODIES WAS HINDERED BY THE CAPTAIN AND HISS AUTHORIZATION.THE CAPTAIN WAS WAITING THE COMPANY AUTHORIZATION. THE PERSON APPOINTED BY THE COMPANY FAILED TO BE CONTACTED . 5. COMPANY IS NOT MAKE CORRECT RESPONSE AND NOT GIVE THE SHIP SHORE BASED SUPPORT AS PER SMM.08. 6. SHIP MASTER IS NOT FAMILIAR WITH SMS MANUAL ON BOARD. 7. SHIP MASTER IS NOT MAKE REPORT OR ORGANIZE REPORT, INVESTIGATE AND ANALYZE TO FIND CAUSE OF ACCIDENT AS PER SMM.09. 8. MASTER AND OFFICERE IN CHARGE OF CARGO OPERATION ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH CARGO SECURING MANUAL. 9. INTENDED CARGO IS NOT LISTED ON CARGO SECURING MANUAL. 10. TRAGIC ACCIDENT, DIRECT LOSS, DEATH OF CREW NOT AS PER MLC DOC.1 AND DOC.2 (SMP.07). 11. BASED ON DEFICIENCIES ABOVE SHIP ISM CODE FAILURE BY COMPANY RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY; MASTER RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY; RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL.EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS; DESIGNATED PERSON; REPORT OF NON CONF, ACCIDENT AND HAZARDOUS OCCURRED. 12. THE COMPANY DOES NOT PRIORITIZE SAFETY IN CARGO ACTIVITIES, THE USE OF WEB SLING IS ORDERED BY THE COMPANY. 7GERMANY 7Panama 7La Plata 7 ARGENTINA 7 2022.2.25 721. AUXILIARY ENGINE (GENERATOR)#1 IS OUT OF SERVICE; 2. INCINERATOR IS OUT OF SERVICE; 3. THERE IS AN OBJETIVE EVIDENCE THAT CAPTAIN DIDN'T INFORM TO THIS MARITIME AUTHORITY REGARDING OUT OF SERVICE OF GENERATOR #1 AND INCINERATOR, DURING STAYING OPRIOR TO ENTRANCE IN ARGENTINE NATIONAL WATERS. 7 2022.2.18 7 Singapore 7 Singapore 7Dampier 72022.3.9 7C1. Rescue boat engine and its propulsion system not operational. 7Hongkong,China 7Hongkong,China 7 Bulk Carrier 7Venice 7ITALY 7 AUSTRALIA 7 2022.3.18 71. FS Endorsement letter of application for 3rd Off., 3rd Eng, and 4/Eng are expired on 05/03/2022. 2. Safety management audit by the Administration is required before departure of the ship. Deficiency(s) marked ISM is (are) objective evidence of a serious failure, or lack of effectiveness, of implementation of the ISM Code. 3. A refrigerated cell for food (with the refrigerating system in operation) is used as a garbage deposit (with a large amount of organic waste / food garbage deposited inside). The chief mate reports that it will be reused as a food deposit after the garbage is given away. in addition, the other cell is precariously arranged (food piled up indistinctly, poorly preserved and deposited directly on the floor). 4. the fire drill highlighted the following irregularities: - failure to adopt preventive measures to isolate the area (damper / ventilation closure - access closure) - lack of adequate information on the area affected by the emergency (transit of people other than firefighters in the burned area) - incorrect execution of the specific risk verification activities (opening of the door of the fire area - galley - by other personnel than the firefighters, lack of protection of support personnel for. 5. 3 way valves of OWS is not working. The ch. eng. reports requesting replacement. There is no evidence of exemption / derogation / formal information or other valid documentary evidence of the competent RO / FS. No preventive information evidence to PSC Office and Harbour Master. 6. during the EFP test the following was found: - failure of local pressure gauges in the EFP; - the stern firehose has 2 holes and a leak at the connection to the hydrant; - 2 portside main fire line joints have water leakage. 7 Vancouver 7CANADA 7 2022.3.25 7Greece 7Ust-Luga 7RUSSIA 7China 7Almeria 7SPAIN 7 2022.3.28 71. OWS out of order. 2. Cleanless of engine room: Leakage in engine and generator number one.Posing fire hazard. 3. Fire drills lack of training. 7 Wilhelmshaven 7Jakarta 7H1. Strong water ingress through then stern tube seal flooding the engine room. 2. Safety management audit by the Administration is required before departure of the ship. Deficiency(s) marked ISM is (are) objective evidence of a serious failure, or lack of effectiveness, of implementation of the ISM Code. 3. Due to stern tube seal leakage oil was entering into the sea. 4. Found a not approved Battery Charging installation. 5. Found on AE 1 and 3 Exhaust Gas leakage on T/C, A/E 1 with Oil leakage on cylinder heads, AE 3 exhaust gas manifold metal insulation defect. 7 1. Ten out of twenty Top Side Tanks manholes observed not to be watertight and overflowing ballast water from within the tank to deck. Most of the top side tank manholes on deck observed with missing studs, nuts or with loose nuts on studs or nuts reaching only half of the nut when tigthened. 2. Safety Management Audit by the administration is required before departure of the ship. Deficiencies marked ISM are objective evidence of a serious failure, or lack of effectiveness, of the implementation ofthe ISM Code. 7Marshall Island 7GERMANY 7N2022.4.6 7"1. Found upper hatch in engine room funnel stucked in approx. 5cm open position. 2. Most of the walking grids in engine room not fixed. 3. Safety management audit by the Administration is required before departure of the ship. Deficiency(s) marked I<SM is (are) objective evidence of a serious failure, or lack of effectiveness, of implementation of the ISM Code. 4. Found most starboard bridge window glass without triangle mark, so not clear, wheter safety gals or not. 5. Funnel fire flaps can get closed completely, but not get fixed in closed position. 6. Found several single way valves on drainage pipes for hatch coamings damaged (ball inside missing). 7. Both masthead lights showing wrong sector (installed stern lights instead of toplights). Stern light and port side light cases damaged, upper light kept in position only by gravity. 8. Found emergency exits on cranes blocked. The grd can not get opened complely and not get secured in half open position. Therefore leaving of crane cabin nearly impossible. Half of each escape ladders cut off, so even when escaping from cabin in emergency case would be possible, the escape would be stopped around 10m above deck in nowhere. 9. Several lights and emergency lights on deck out of function. 10. No fresh provision on board. Vessel was some days ago in amsterdam and also did not order any fresh provision. Company has to ensure, that always enough fresh provision is available. New fresh provision to be provided on board immediately. 11. Several electrical installations on deck and engine room found in unsafe condition. 12. Found cold room in dirty condition: Vegetable store cooling unit full of dust and mould, sprayed also on ceiling. Floor dirty. Lobby pipes wet and dirty. 13. On several manholes on main deck some bolts/nuts for securing missing. 14. Galley exhaust hood pipe full of old oil and fat. Dirty floor below cupboards. Microwave in pantry dirty. Drainage dirty.  71. Superstructure doors fm port and starboard side not properly secured. 2. Lifeboats certificates expired. 3. Alomizing regulafor of auxialery bolier No.2 has big leakage of steam. 4. Ass(Air supply system) leakage of liveboard starboard side. 7 Bremerhaven 7iHong Kong, China 7" Container 7"Greece 7N 2022.4.28 7"1. During operational of the vessel in COSCO terminal, a serious accident took place. A stevedore worker during his work fell from a great high. At the time of inspection in the fourth floor of lashing bridge, No.16 (Bay 55-57) guard rails found corroded in many points. At the exact position of the serious occupational accident, the horizontal guard rails (two pieces) were found heavily corroded and broken. Similarly at the same corridor of the fourth floor of passage way (a little further away, at a distance of about 20meters from the position of the accident) ,another part of guard railing was found heavily corroded and broken which also poses a serious accident hazard for crew and workers. Additionally corroded rails observed in No.6, No.9 and No.11 lashing bridges which randomly visited. All lashing bridge railings to be checked accordingly under the RO supervision. 2. Regarding the railing (mainly at the 4th floor of the lashing bridges), effective and reasonable precautions and measures had not been taken to reduce and prevent occupational accidents that may arise from presence of the worker stevedores or crew at the specific points. This specific dangerous area was unsafe and as a result of the extended corrosion, there specific rails broken and the stevedore worker fell from a great high to the main deck (about 15 meters high).Classification Society should be notified and further investigation to be carried out in order to evaluate the condition of guard railings to all lashing bridges of the vessel. 3. Standard text for action code 19(action code 17 +detention): Safety management audit by the administration is required before departure of the ship. 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