

Notice on Litton Marine Systems (Sperry Marine) Steering console components replacement

All relevant shipping companies:

According to the Marine Safety Advisory Letter No.07/11 released by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada(TSB) on Jan. 2012, the potentiometers should be replaced at 5 years intervals for the Steer Gear made by Litton Marine Systems(Sperry Marine). For more details, please refer to the attached electronic copy of TSB Marine Safety Advisory 07/11.

All relevant shipping companies are advised to pay due attention to the Notice and take appropriate actions.

Hereby notify the above.

This Classification Information is published on CCS website (www.ccs.org.cn) and is to be forwarded by CCS branches to relevant shipping companies in relevance to their business area.

Classed Ship in Service Department
China Classification Society

Attachment: TSB Marine Safety Advisory 07/11

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du Canada



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of Canada

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JAN 31 2012



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616-07/11
M11L0160

Mr. Derek Hodgson
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UNITED KINGDOM

**RE : Marine Safety Advisory Letter No. 07/11
Litton Marine Systems (Sperry Marine) Steering console components
replacement**

On 15 December 2011, the Marshall Islands registered bulk carrier *ORSULA*, IMO 9110901, departed Contrecoeur, Québec, Canada in ballast for Baie Comeau, Québec. While down bound in the St. Lawrence River under the conduct of a pilot, the vessel lost steering and ran aground on the Batture Gentilly, 1.25 miles north east of Bécancour wharf, Québec. It was refloated on the first attempt using tugs about 48 hours later. The vessel sustained hull damage requiring repairs. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigation is ongoing (TSB Occurrence M11L0160).

Information obtained by the TSB investigation has indicated that the vessel experienced a loss of steering control when the No 2 servo-motor's wheel potentiometer failed while the rudder was at 10° to starboard. Further helm movements to port were unsuccessful and the vessel sheered to starboard and exited the channel.

In 1999, *Litton Marine Systems (Sperry Marine)* published a service document recommending that potentiometers be replaced at 5 years intervals on their similarly equipped steering consoles. The document, *STEERING GEAR - TEST, DRILLS AND PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE* (12 March 1999, Rev. A.), was issued to authorized technician companies. This document was not found on board, nor was the information present in the ship's steering gear instruction manual. The manufacturer of the potentiometer has indicated that it was produced and supplied to Sperry in 1994. At the time of the occurrence, there was no documentation indicating that the potentiometer had been replaced since the vessel was constructed in 1996.

The TSB is unable to determine how many vessels may be constructed with similar potentiometers. The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) may therefore wish to inform their member classification societies of the circumstances of this steering gear failure and the necessity to replace potentiometers in similar Litton Marine Systems (Sperry Marine) steering systems at or before the recommended interval of 5 years. Additionally, IACS may wish to verify that the manufacturer's service instructions are onboard vessels fitted with similar systems. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada would like to hear of any action you may take in this regard.

Yours sincerely,



Marc-André Poisson
Director of Investigations – Marine

cc. Transport Canada
Fednav Ltd (as sister ships owners)
Anglo-Eastern Ship Management (as sister ships Manager)
Sperry Marine
DNV
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION

TSB Occurrence No: M11L0160

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TYPES OF TSB SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS

GENERAL

The purpose of a safety communication is to ensure that identified risks are communicated to those persons or organizations best able to effect change to convince them to take remedial action.

OCCURRENCE BULLETINS

An occurrence bulletin is a formal, written, safety communication used to inform regulatory or industry stakeholders of potential operational or technical concerns that were uncovered by the TSB's initial examination of the circumstances surrounding an occurrence. Bulletins contain only factual information.

SAFETY INFORMATION LETTERS

Safety information letters are generally concerned with safety deficiencies posing relatively low risks, and are used to inform regulatory or industry stakeholders of unsafe conditions that do not require immediate remedial action. Safety information letters are used to pass information for the purposes of safety promotion or to support or clarify issues that are being examined by a stakeholder.

SAFETY ADVISORY LETTERS

Safety advisory letters are concerned with safety deficiencies that pose low to medium risks, and used to inform regulatory or industry stakeholders of unsafe conditions. A safety advisory letter suggests remedial action to reduce risks to safety.

SAFETY CONCERNS

Safety concerns focus on an identified unsafe condition for which there is insufficient evidence to validate a systemic safety deficiency. However, the risks posed by this unsafe condition warrant highlighting. A safety concern provides a marker to the industry and the regulator that the Board has insufficient information to warrant further recommendations at this time; however, as more data and analysis become available, the Board will return to this unsafe condition if it is not readily redressed.

SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

The *Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act* (CTAISB Act) makes specific provision for the Board to make recommendations to correct identified safety deficiencies. Recommendations are used to address those systemic safety deficiencies posing the highest risks to the transportation system and, therefore, warranting the highest levels of regulatory and corporate attention.

RESPONSES TO TSB SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS

The *CTAISB Act* requires that federal ministers provide formal responses as to actions taken or planned in response to TSB recommendations. The Act does not mandate responses by other stakeholders to whom Board recommendations are issued. Notwithstanding, these stakeholders are requested to provide a response, and normally do so.

Although responses to other forms of safety communications are not requested or expected, the TSB often receives responses to safety advisory and safety information letters, and the substance of these responses are reflected in the Board's investigation report.